
















We study games in which players search for an optimal action pro¯le. All action pro¯les are either a success,
with a payo® of one, or a failure, with a payo® of zero. Players do not know the location of success pro¯les.
Instead each player is privately informed about the marginal distribution of success pro¯les over his actions. We
characterize optimal joint search strategies.
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November 4, 20051 Introduction
This paper investigates rational multi-agent search for an optimal pro¯le of actions through trial
and error. The focus is on a benchmark case that already poses considerable di±culties: agents
are assumed to have common interest and not to communicate.
The most closely related work in the literature is on repeated coordination games, where
payo®s are known and participants have repeated opportunities to coordinate on an optimal
combination of actions (e.g. an industry standard), and on rendezvous search problems, where
the participants' goal is to ¯nd each other in the shortest time possible on some geographical
domain. The innovation in the present paper is to consider strategic situations in which (1) the
payo®s from each action are not known, but have to be discovered, (2) agents search not for
each other but for an optimal joint choice of actions, and (3) agents have private information
about which of their actions are likely to contribute to a success.
Situations like this abound in practice. Consider for example the coordination problem
between the marketing department and the production department of a ¯rm when there is un-
certainty about how consumers respond to a given mix of product characteristics and marketing
strategy, or the coordination problem between separate government agencies facing a common
issue (poverty, environmental degradation, a terrorist threat) when there is uncertainty about
the optimal policy mix.
Frequently in these settings search strategies will be imperfectly coordinated and information
will be imperfectly shared. A prominent recent example is the lack of information sharing
between law enforcement agencies that has at least partly been blamed for the failure to prevent
the September 11 attacks. While improved communication is often helpful, there may be cost
and institutional reasons that prevent the establishment of the appropriate infrastructure for
large-scale information exchange. One obvious example is that of an auditing ¯rm serving
multiple clients; the auditing ¯rm may need to erect \Chinese walls" to safeguard the proprietary
information of its clients. For these reasons, this paper investigates the benchmark case where
agents can neither share their private information nor explicitly coordinate their joint search.
The broader goal of this research is to better understand such issues as: the simultaneous
search for optimal policies by multiple government agencies; the problem of how to best coun-
teract ¯rms who tacitly search for illegal collusive arrangements in markets; the problem of how
to disrupt simultaneous search e®orts by members of clandestine organizations; and, the e®ect
of barriers to information exchange, so-called \Chinese Walls," on simultaneous search e®orts
by separate departments in an organization (as practiced e.g. in ¯nancial, legal and auditing
¯rms).
12 Examples and Applications
In this section, we give additional examples and describe a variety of applications that help
illustrate the class of problems we are interested in.
A stylized example of the situations we have in mind is that of a group of individuals wanting
to open a safe, when each has access to a separate dial, there is one unknown combination of
settings of the dials that will open the safe, the individuals are visually separated, and they
have to avoid communication in order not to be discovered. Communication would allow them
to coordinate their search and perhaps to share private information of which settings are more
likely to be the correct combinations. Absent communication, it may be di±cult to properly
re°ect private information in the search order and to avoid combinations that have been tried
before.
Another example is that of two parties trying to coordinate on a radio frequency. In that
case, since communication is the objective, it cannot help in coordinating the search. We are
concerned with the situation where the parties may have private information about, but do
not know, which frequencies are available (some of the frequencies may be jammed). If the
available frequencies were commonly known, this would be a version of the telephone problem
that was proposed by Steve Alpern (see Alpern [1976]). In the telephone problem, there is an
equal number of telephones in two rooms. They are pairwise connected. In each period a person
in each room picks up the receiver on one of the phones. The goal is to identify a working
connection according to a payo® criterion that favors early discovery, e.g. minimum expected
time or expected present discounted value.
An applied health economics example is that of multiple physicians simultaneously treating
the same patient. Here communication may be prevented by simple lack of time, inadequate
technology for ¯le sharing, or privacy concerns. The physicians may be uncertain about which
treatment combination is likely to be e®ective. This problem is similar to that of multiple
consultants advising the same company on di®erent dimensions and who may be uncertain of
which (multi-dimensional) course of action is likely to succeed. Despite a common interest in the
success of the company, they may not want to or are unable to share proprietary information.
Similarly, an organization with multiple departments searching for an optimal course of action
may have rules preventing exchange of information between departments (so-called \Chinese
walls") if such an informational exchange could involve a con°ict of interest, e.g. an accounting
¯rm operating both as an auditor of a ¯rm and as a consultant for that ¯rm, or an accounting
¯rm working for multiple clients and handling those clients' proprietary information.
Situations in which searching agents have to be secretive ¯t naturally into our environment
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have to operate under radio silence, another coordination between members of a clandestine
organization. Economic versions of such examples arise naturally in collusion between ¯rms,
where communication is explicitly illegal. Imagine two ¯rms choosing product characteristic
who are afraid that characteristics that are close in the minds of consumers increase price
competition. Firms may have beliefs about, but not know, which characteristics are perceived
as close by consumers.
The common interest assumption is made because we want to understand information ag-
gregation and processing, which turns out to be delicate enough even without confounding it
with payo® di®erences. This approach is not unusual. A prominent example is provided by
the literature on the Condorcet jury theorem and related issues of information aggregation, e.g.
McLennan [1998]. This approach is also pursued in the literature on rendezvous search where
two or more parties attempt to ¯nd each other in the least time in some search space subject
to a constraint on their speed (this literature is surveyed in Alpern [2002] and Alpern and Gal
[2003]).
Broadly, the problem that interests us is related to other models of rational learning of payo®s
in games, e.g. Wiseman's [2005] work on repeated games with unknown payo® distributions and
Gossner and Vieille's [2003] work on games in which players learn their payo®s from experience.
Another prominent example is the work on social learning, e.g. Banerjee [1992], Bikchandani,
Hirshleifer and Welch [1992], and the recent book by Chamley [2004]. The problem addressed in
the present paper { joint search for a hidden success with private information about the success
location { is novel. A direct antecedent is Blume and Franco [2005] who study joint search for a
success pro¯le under complete information and with a symmetry constraint on joint strategies,
and Blume, Du®y and Franco [2004] who look at the same problem experimentally.
3 Setup
We consider games in which players have payo® uncertainty and have private information about
the distribution of payo®s. Each player has a ¯nite set of actions Ai with cardinality J(i):
Let A := £n
i=1Ai denote the set of action pro¯les. There is a set of payo® functions U with
typical element u 2 U: Any pair of an action pro¯le a 2 A and a payo® function u 2 U
determines a payo® ui(a) for player i: Players face payo® uncertainty. In order to model this
uncertainty, we introduce the set of distributions ¢(U) over the set of possible payo® functions
U: In addition we want to consider players who have private information about the nature of
the payo® uncertainty. For this purpose, we introduce another layer of uncertainty: There is
3a common knowledge distribution F over the set ¢(U) of possible distributions over payo®
functions. Players choose actions in each of T periods, where T may be in¯nite. At the end of
each period, each player learns only his own payo® for that period. Players evaluate payo®s in
the T-period game according to the expected present discounted value of the sum of stage-game
payo®s, with common discount factor ± 2 (0;1): The timing is as follows: (1) Nature draws a
distribution D 2 ¢(U) from the distribution F: (2) Each player receives a signal si(D) 2 Si that
is a function of the realized distribution D: (3) A payo® pro¯le u is drawn from the realized
distribution D: (4) The T-period game starts.
Unless otherwise stated, we focus on the subclass of independent search-for-success games
in which (1) U consists of all those payo® functions that give all players a payo® of one for
exactly one action pro¯le, a success, and otherwise a payo® of zero, a failure, (2) for each player
i and all distributions D in ¢(U) player i's marginal distribution Di is exchangeable, (3) each
player's signal !i(D) is the marginal distribution of D over player i's actions, and (4) each D
is the product of its marginals. Given exchangeability, it is without loss of generality to label
each player i's actions by the probability rank of these actions according to the signal that he
receives, i.e. given signal !i; action ai1(!i) is player i's action with the highest probability of
being part of a success pro¯le, ai2(!i) the action with the second-highest probability, and so on.
Then, we can denote by !i the vector of marginal probabilities observed by individual i where
the individual probabilities have been put in rank order, i.e. !ij is i's marginal probability that
his action aij(!i) of jth rank is part of a success pro¯le. Whenever there is no risk of confusion,
we will suppress the dependence of player i's jth ranked action, and simply write aij for aij(!i):
4 Example: Two Players, Two Actions, Two Periods and Inde-
pendent Uniform Signal Distributions
This section introduces the class of games of interest by way of a 2£2£2-independent-uniform-
example, i.e. with two players, two actions per player, two choice periods, signals that are
independent across players, and a uniform signal distribution. The example serves to develop
intuition that carries over to more general games with an arbitrary (¯nite) number of players and
actions per player, and with an in¯nite time horizon. In the example, one can fully characterize
equilibrium and optimal behavior and illustrate the di±culties arising in joint search more
generally. Speci¯cally, one can show that there are multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria, with the
optimal equilibrium bounded away from ex post e±cient search.
Let each of two players repeatedly choose between two actions. It is common knowledge
between them that exactly one of the four action pro¯les is a \success," but not which one. The
4other pro¯les are failures. The common payo® from a success is (normalized to) one and the
common payo® from a failure is zero. The game ends when a success has been found, or the
time horizon has been reached. Players have a common discount factor ±; so that a success in
period t is worth ±t: Players do not observe each others' actions and therefore when making a
choice in any period can condition only on the history of their own actions.
Suppose in addition that before the ¯rst period each player privately receives a signal that
informs him of the probability with which each of his actions is part of a success pro¯le. For
simplicity, let signals be independent across players. Then, if player one receives the signal !1j
that his action a1j is part of a success pro¯le and player two receives the signal !2k that his
action a2k is part of a success pro¯le, the probability that the pro¯le (a1j;a2k) is a success is
!1j ¢ !2k. Simplify further by assuming that player one's (two's) signal !11 (!21) that his ¯rst
action is part of a success is uniformly distributed on the interval [0;1]:
In this section, in order to simplify notation, for player one, denote the higher of his two
signals by ®, i.e. ® := !11 Similarly, for player two, de¯ne ¯ := !21: ® is the ¯rst order
statistic of the uniform distribution on the one-dimensional unit simplex. Note that ® and ¯
are independently and uniformly distributed on the interval [1
2;1]: In the sequel, when talking
about player one's action, it will be convenient to refer to his ® (or high-probability) action and
his 1 ¡ ® (or low probability) action, and similarly for player two.
Simplifying once again, consider the two-period game. In this game, players only have to
decide which action to choose in the ¯rst period and whether or not to switch to a di®erent
action in the second period if the ¯rst-period choice fails to deliver a success.
It is immediately clear that the full-information solution (or ex post-e±cient search), which
a social planner with access to both players' private information would implement, is not an
equilibrium in the game with private information. The social planner would prescribe the ®-
action to player one and the ¯-action to player two in the ¯rst period, and in the second period
would prescribe the pro¯le (®;(1 ¡ ¯)) if ®(1 ¡ ¯) > (1 ¡ ®)¯; and the pro¯le ((1 ¡ ®);¯)
otherwise. The players themselves, who only have access to their own information, are unable
to carry out these calculations and cannot decide which of the two players should switch actions
and who should stick to his ¯rst-period action.
This raises a number of questions: What is the constrained planner's optimum, i.e. which
strategy pro¯le would a planner prescribe who does not have access to the players' private
information? What are the Nash equilibria of the game? What is the relationship between the
(constrained) planner's solution and the Nash equilibria of the game?
Since this is a common interest game, i.e. the payo® functions of the players coincide, there
5is a simple relation between optimality and equilibrium. An optimal strategy pro¯le must be
a Nash equilibrium (see Alpern [2002], Crawford and Haller [1990], and McLennan [1998]). A
useful corollary of this observation is that if we have a Nash equilibrium and there is another
strategy, with higher payo®s for both players, then either the latter strategy is an equilibrium
or there exists an equilibrium with even higher payo®s for both players.
Two strategy pro¯les are easily seen to be equilibria. In one, player one takes his ® action
in both periods and player two takes his ¯ action in the ¯rst and his 1 ¡ ¯ action in the second
period. In the second equilibrium, player two stays with his ¯ action throughout and player one
switches. In these equilibria only the ¯rst-period decision is sensitive to the players' information;
the switching decision does not depend on the signal. One may wonder whether it would not
be better to tie the switching probability to the signal as well. Intuitively, a player one with a
strong signal, ® close to one, should be less inclined to switch than a player with a weak signal,
® close to one half. In order to investigate the possibility of such equilibria, we need to formally
describe players' strategies.
A strategy for player i has three components: (1) pi(®), the probability of taking the high-
probability action in period 1 as a function of the signal; (2) qi
h(®), the probability of taking the
high-probability action in period 2 after having taken the high-probability action in period 1, as
a function of the signal; and (3), qi
l(®), the probability of taking the high-probability action in
period 2 after having taken the low-probability action in period 1, as a function of the signal.
Fix a strategy for player 2. We are interested in the payo® of player one for anyone of his
types, for any possible action sequence he may adopt, and for any possible strategy of player
two. In writing down payo®s, we will use the fact that in equilibrium player two will never stick
to his low-probability action in the second period after having used his low-probability action
in the ¯rst period, i.e. q2
l (¯) = 1 for all ¯ 2 [1
2;1] in every equilibrium. Then type ® of player 1














[®¯± + ®(1 ¡ ¯)](1 ¡ p2(¯))d¯
Player 1's payo® from taking the high-probability action in the ¯rst and the low-probability
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[®(1 ¡ ¯) + (1 ¡ ®)¯±](1 ¡ p2(¯))d¯
Player 1's payo® from taking the low-probability action in the ¯rst and the high-probability
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[®¯± + (1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¯)](1 ¡ p2(¯))d¯
The sequence of actions LL is strictly dominated for all ® > 1
2:
Simple inspection yields the following observations about these three payo®s: All three
payo®s are linear in ®; HH(¢) is strictly increasing in ®; HH(1) ¸ LH(1) (with equality only at





This implies that in equilibrium player 1 (similarly for player 2) either plays HH for all ®; or
HL for all ®, or LH for all ®; or there exists a critical value c1 such that he plays HL for ® · c1
and HH for ® > c1; or there exists a critical value c1 such that he plays LH for ® · c1 and HH
for ® > c1: In addition, against a player using only the action sequences HH and HL, the action
sequence LH is never optimal, because in that case HL is a better response. This leaves only
two possible types of equilibria:
1. HL-equilibria in which player i has a cuto® ci such that he uses HL for ® below this cuto®
(and HH above the cuto®), and
2. LH-equilibria in which player i has a cuto® ci such that he uses LH for ® below this cuto®
(and HH above the cuto®).















[ci¯ + (1 ¡ ci)(1 ¡ ¯)±]d¯ i = 1;2:
7This system has exactly three solutions in the relevant range of ci 2 [1
2;1] i = 1;2: These
are, (c1;c2) = (:5;1); (c1;c2) = (1;:5); and (c1;c2) ¼ (0:760935;0:760935):















[ci¯± + (1 ¡ ci)(1 ¡ ¯)]d¯ i = 1;2:
In this case the solutions of this system of equations in the relevant range of ci 2 [1
2;1] i = 1;2;
depend on ±: For ± = 1; there are three solutions: (c1;c2) = (:5;1); (c1;c2) = (1;:5); and a
symmetric solution. Otherwise, there is a unique solution, which is symmetric, i.e. there is a
common cuto® c(±); which is a strictly increasing function of ±; with c(0) = :5.
The fact that there is a unique LH-equilibrium for each ± 2 (0;1) can be shown as follows:
Substitute one of the equations in (5) into the other in order to eliminate the variable c2. This
leaves, for any ±; a ¯fth-order polynomial Á(¢) in the variable c1; which has at most ¯ve real
roots and at most four local extrema. The relevant roots are the ones in the interval [1
2;1]: The
function Á(¢) satis¯es (1) Á(1
2) < 0 8± 2 (0;1) and (2) Á(1) > 0 8± 2 (0;1): Di®erentiating Á(¢)
gives a fourth-order polynomial Ã(¢) which satis¯es for all ± 2 (0;1) the following conditions:
(1) Ã(c1) > 0 for su±ciently small c1 (c1 ! ¡1), (2) Ã(:2) < 0, (3) Ã(:7) > 0; (4) Ã(1) < 0;
and (5) Ã(c1) > 0 for su±ciently large c1 (c1 ! 1).
As local extrema of Á correspond to the roots of Ã; one local extremum (a maximum) of
Á must be in the interval (¡1;:2); another (a minimum) in the interval (:2;:7); another (a
maximum) in the interval (:7;1); and another (a minimum) in the interval (1;1): Using the fact
that Á(1
2) < 0 and Á(1) > 0; and that Á has only one local minimum in the interval (:2;:7) and
only one local maximum in the interval (:7;1); the equation Á(c1) = 0 has a unique solution for
c1 2 [1
2;1]: Thus there exists only one equilibrium, which must be symmetric as c2 has to satisfy
the same equation. We can summarize our discussion by the following observation:
Proposition 1 For any ± 2 (0;1); the two-player two-action two-period game with signals that
are independently and uniformly distributed has exactly four Nash equilibria: One symmetric
HL-equilibrium with common cuto® c ¼ 0:760935; two asymmetric HL-equilibria with cuto®s
(c1;c2) = (:5;1) and (c1;c2) = (1;:5); respectively, and one symmetric LH-equilibrium with
common cuto® c(±) that is strictly increasing in ±:
An LH-equilibrium cannot be optimal: To see this, simply change both players' strategies
to HL-strategies, without changing the cuto®. Under the original strategies, there are three
8possible events, each arising with strictly positive probability: Both players follow an HH-
sequence; both follow an LH sequence; and, one follows an LH-sequence while the other follows
an HH sequence. Clearly LH is not optimal against HH and therefore in this instance the new
strategy yields a strict improvement. Also, both players following HL rather than LH yields a
strict improvement. Thus in two events there is a strict payo® improvement, in the remaining
event payo®s are una®ected, and all three events have strictly positive probability.
It is not immediately clear whether to prefer the symmetric HL-equilibrium or the asymmetric
HL-equilibria. In either, there is positive probability that pro¯les are searched in the wrong
order. The symmetric equilibrium makes the second-period switching probability sensitive to
a player's signal, which seems sensible. At the same time, it introduces an additional possible
source of ine±ciency. Players may not succeed in the ¯rst round despite having signals so strong
that they do not switch in the second round. In that case, they ine±ciently search only one of
the available pro¯les.
It would be a straightforward matter to calculate and compare payo®s from symmetric and
asymmetric equilibria directly. We will follow a di®erent route in order to introduce some
methodological ideas that may prove useful more generally. Start with the asymmetric HL-
equilibrium in which c1 = 1
2 and c2 = 1: Consider the (informationally constrained) social
planner who raises c1 from 1
2 and lowers c2 from 1 by the same amount °: His second-period





































> 0: Hence, the social planer
can improve on the two asymmetric equilibria. Recall that for any arbitrary strategy pro¯le ¾;
either ¾ is an equilibrium or there exists an equilibrium ¾¤ with ui(¾¤) > ui(¾) for i = 1;2: Thus
the pair of cuto® strategy pro¯les with cuto®s c1 = 1=2+° and c2 = 1¡° with an appropriately
small value of ° either is an equilibrium or there exists an equilibrium that strictly dominates
it. Therefore, we have the following observation:
Proposition 2 For any ± 2 (0;1); in the two-player two-action two-period game with signals
that are independently and uniformly distributed, the symmetric HL-equilibrium is the optimal
equilibrium and at the same time the optimal strategy that an informationally constrained social
planner would implement.
94.1 The 2£2 Uniform Example with an In¯nite Horizon
In the in¯nite-horizon game there are equilibria in which players conduct a joint exhaustive
search without repetition. This search is guaranteed to be successful in no more than four
periods.
We will show for a range of values of the discount factor that (1) these exhaustive-search
equilibria are not optimal for a social planner who has to respect the same informational con-
straints as the players, (2) there exists an equilibrium in the in¯nite horizon-game with higher
expected payo® than from exhaustive search and (3) that a payo®-maximizing equilibrium will
lead to repetition of action pro¯les with positive probability.
There are exactly two exhaustive-search equilibria. They simply exchange the roles of the
two player and thus have identical payo®s. For concreteness, we argue with reference to the
exhaustive search equilibrium in which only player switches in period 2, both players switch
in period 3 and only player 2 switches in period 4, i.e. in terms of their signals, players move
through cells in the following order: (®;¯);(®;1 ¡ ¯);(1 ¡ ®;¯);(1 ¡ ®;1 ¡ ¯): We proceed by
showing that the following strategy leads to a higher expected payo® than exhaustive search
for some values of ±: Pick the likelihood-maximizing action in the ¯rst period. Use a symmetric
cuto® rule with cuto® value c in the second period.1 Revert to the exhaustive-search equilibrium
from the third period on (i.e. if there is no success before period three, resume exhaustive search
in the cell (®;1 ¡ ¯)). Refer to this strategy as modi¯ed exhaustive search.
The payo® from modi¯ed exhaustive search equals:
1An alternative approach would be to adopt the methodology from the previous subsection, i.e. to look at
small departures from exhaustive search equilibria, slightly lowering the switching player's cuto® value from 1
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= (1 ¡ c2)2 + ±2(1 ¡ c2)(1 ¡ c)2 + ±3(1 ¡ c)2(1 ¡ c2) + ±4(1 ¡ c)4
For example, the second line of the above expression is the contribution to expected payo®s
from the event that player 1 receives a signal ® < c and player 2 receives a signal ¯ > c: In that
event, a success will be found in the ¯rst period with probability ®¯; in the second period player
1 switches (because of his relatively low signal) while player 2 stays put leading to a success
probability of (1¡®)¯; in the third period exhaustive search is resumed in the cell ®(1¡¯); in
the fourth period, the cell (1 ¡®)¯ that was unsuccessfully visited in period 2 is revisited, with
an expected payo® of zero for that period; and, in the ¯fth period the remaining (1 ¡®)(1¡¯)
cell is visited.












[9 + 3± + 3±2 + ±3]
We can plot the di®erence of the two payo®s as a function of c and ± as follows. The plot















12As can be seen in the following contour plot, however, there is a region, indicated in white,
in which the payo® from modi¯ed exhaustive search exceeds that from exhaustive search. In the
black region, the payo® di®erence between modi¯ed exhaustive search and exhaustive search is
negative.








In this section we generalize the intuition from our 2 £ 2 £ 2 independent-uniform example to
games with an arbitrary ¯nite number of players, an arbitrary ¯nite (not necessarily identical)
number of actions per player, an in¯nite time horizon and a rich class of signal distributions,
while maintaining the assumption of signal independence across players.
We begin with the simple observation that players in our game are unable to implement ex
post-optimal search.
Observation The full-information optimal strategy (i.e. ex post-optimal search) is not a Nash
equilibrium strategy.
To see this, observe that for almost all signal vectors of player i there exists a positive
probability set of signal vectors of others players such that the full-information optimal strategy
13has player i switch in period two. At the same time, there is a positive probability set of signal
vectors for which the full-information optimal strategy prescribes that player i does not switch
in period two. This behavior cannot be achieved in equilibrium since player i's behavior can
only depend on his own information.
Ex post optimal search cannot be implemented because players do not know the signal
strengths of other players. In contrast, there is a large class of equilibria in strategies that
condition only on the rank order of signals not their value. We refer to such strategies as ordinal
strategies, and to equilibria in ordinal strategies as ordinal equilibria. Some ordinal equilibria
are appealing because they induce a novel action pro¯le as long as such pro¯les are available,
i.e. they search exhaustively. We will see, however, that not all ordinal equilibria are exhaustive
equilibria and that there is a multitude of Pareto-ranked exhaustive equilibria.
We next formally de¯ne ordinal strategies and characterize the set of equilibria in ordinal
strategies. Let ai denote player i's action in the action pro¯le a: De¯ne r(ai) as the rank of
player i's action ai in descending order of his observed probabilities, i.e. a higher value of r(ai)
indicating a higher probability of ai being part of a success pro¯le, breaking ties in an arbitrary
manner if necessary. Recall the convention that aij(!i) is player i's jth-ranked action given
his signal !i and let hit(!i) be player i's private history of such actions until period t: Then a
strategy fi of player i is ordinal if fi(hit(!i);!i) = fi(hit(!i);!0
i) for all !i;!0
i: Thus, in an ordinal
strategy, the only role of player i's signal is to determine the labeling of his actions according to
their rank. A pro¯le f is ordinal if it is composed of ordinal strategies; otherwise, it is cardinal.
For any ordinal pro¯le f; let at(f) denote the pro¯le of actions that the strategy f induces in
period t: Similarly, de¯ne At(f) := fa 2 Aja¿(f) = a for some ¿ · tg as the set of all pro¯les
that the ordinal strategy f induces before period t + 1:
Notice that if an ordinal strategy pro¯le after some time prescribes an action pro¯le from
which a player can reach an unused pro¯le in which his own action has a higher rank, then this
player can unilaterally deviate and improve the search order. Conversely, in an ordinal strategy
pro¯le in which no player can ever unilaterally reach an unused pro¯le in which his own action
has a higher rank than the one prescribe by the pro¯le, no player can deviate to a strategy that
would improve the search order. Hence, we have the following characterization of equilibria in
ordinal strategies.
Proposition 3 A pro¯le of ordinal strategies f is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for all
players i and all times t there does not exist ai 2 Ai such that (i) ai 6= at
i(f); (ii) (ai;at
¡i(f)) 2
A n At¡1(f); and (iii) r(ai) > r(at
i(f)):
14Proof: We begin by proving that any such pro¯le f is an equilibrium. Suppose not. Then there
exists a player i; a set of signals S that has positive probability, and a pure strategy f0
i such
that ¼i(f0
i;f¡i;!i) > ¼i(f;!i) for all types !i 2 S: Without loss of generality, we may assume
that none of the signals in S require tie breaking in order to determine the probability rank of
player i's actions. Consider a type !i in S: Let ¿ be the ¯rst period in which a¿(f0
i;f¡i) 6= a¿(f):
There are two possibilities: Either a¿(f0
i;f¡i) 2 At¡1(f); or a¿(f0
i;f¡i) 2 A n At¡1(f) and
r(a¿(f0
i;f¡i)) < a¿(f):
Let µ > ¿ be the ¯rst period in which a¿
¡i(f) = aµ





i ) = at
i(f0
i) 8t 6= ¿;µ
a¿
i (f00




i ) = a¿
i (f0
i):
Evidently, this raises the probability of ¯nding a success in period ¿ by the same amount that
it lowers it in period µ: Because of discounting this raises the payo® of type !i 2 S:
If there is no µ with a¿
¡i(f) = aµ




i ) = at
i(f0
i) 8t 6= ¿
a¿
i (f00
i ) = a¿
i (f):
Evidently, also in this case, the payo® of type !i is increased.
Iterating this procedure generates a sequence of action pro¯les that converges to at(f). Fur-
thermore the payo® of type !i 2 S is non-decreasing at each step of the iteration, contradicting
the assumption that f0
i induces a higher payo® for type !i than fi against f¡i: This shows that
the strategies described in the statement of the proposition indeed form Nash equilibria.
Conversely, suppose the strategy f is an ordinal Nash equilibrium, but there is a player i;
an action ai and a time ¿ such that conditions (i) { (iii) are satis¯ed. Let µ > ¿ be the ¯rst
period in which a¿
¡i(f) = aµ














If there is no period µ > ¿ with a¿
¡i(f) = aµ










Evidently, in either case the deviation raises the probability of ¯nding a success in period ¿
by the same amount that it lowers it in period µ: Because of discounting this raises the payo®








Observe that the equilibria characterized in Proposition 3 include (i) equilibria in which all
pro¯les are examined without repetition, (ii) equilibria in which search stops before all pro¯les
have been examined, and (iii) in¯nitely many Pareto-ranked equilibria in which search is tem-
porarily suspended and then resumed. For example, consider the matrix of action pro¯les in
the stage game in Figure 1. In the ¯gure ai;j denotes the j-th action of player i; wlog ranked
in the order of the corresponding signals, i.e. if we denote by ®i;j the probability that the j-th
action of player of player i is part of a success pro¯le, then ®i;j ¸ ®i;j+1 for all i and j: For
convenience, the six action pro¯les have been numbered. Then, (i) there is an equilibrium in
which the pro¯le labelled t is played in period t = 1;:::;6; (ii) another equilibrium in which
the pro¯le labelled t is played in period t = 1;:::;4 after which pro¯le 1 is played forever, and
(iii), for any k > 0 there is an equilibrium in which the pro¯le labelled t is played in period
t = 1;:::;4 after which pro¯le 1 is played for k period followed by play of pro¯les 5 and 6.
We next show that for some class of distributions one can improve on the best ordinal
equilibrium. Say that a player's signal distributions has a mass point at certainty if there is
positive probability that he receives a signal that singles out one of his actions as the one that
is part of a success pro¯le. Similarly, say that a player's signal distributions has a mass point at
indi®erence if there is positive probability that he receives a signal that assigns equal probability
to each of his actions as being part of a success pro¯le. Denote by EC
i the event that i is certain
and by EI
i the event that he is indi®erent.
16Lemma 1 If all players' signal distributions have mass points at certainty and at indi®erence,
the optimal equilibrium is cardinal.
Proof: In any ordinal equilibrium f, there will be one player, i; who switches in period two,
and another player, j; who does not switch in period two. Modify the behavior of these two
players as follows: Let i never switch from his ¯rst-period action when he is certain. Have j
switch in period two to his action aj2 (in an ordinal equilibrium, it is without loss of generality
to always have him use the action aj1 in period 1) when he is indi®erent. Have j otherwise not
change his behavior, except that in the period ¿ > 2 with a¿(f) = (aj2;a2
¡j(f)); he takes the
action a2
j1; instead of a2
j2: Formally, de¯ne f0 such that f0
¡ij = f¡ij; i.e. f coincides with f0 for





























j(fj) 8!j 2 EI
j; t 6= 2;¿
There are four possible cases: (1) If player i is uncertain and player j is not indi®erent, then
the sequence in which cells are examined under the modi¯ed strategy pro¯le f0 is the same as in
the original equilibrium f, and therefore payo®s are the same as well. (2) If player i is certain
and player j is not indi®erent, then player i is using a dominant action and all other players are
following the same behavior as under f¡i: Consequently, the expected payo® cannot be lower
than from all players using strategy f: (3) If player i is uncertain and player j is indi®erent, the
only e®ect of changing from f to f0 is that the order in which two cells are visited is reversed.
Furthermore, these cells are only distinguished by player j's action and player j is indi®erent.
Hence payo®s are unchanged in this case. (4) If player i is certain and player j is indi®erent, the
cell examined in period two has a positive success probability under f0; whereas that probability
is zero under f: Furthermore, since player i is using a dominant action, and all players other
than players i and j do not change their behavior, the overall e®ect of switching from f to f0
is to move the examination of higher probability pro¯les forward. Therefore, in this case the
expected payo® increases. ¤
Next, we show that the ability to improve on the best ordinal equilibrium does not critically
depend on the distribution of signals having mass points.
17Proposition 4 Let F be any distribution of signals that satis¯es independence across players
and that has a positive density f: Then there exists a sequence of distributions Fn with positive
densities fn and an N > 0 such that Fn converges weakly to F and for all n > N the optimal
Nash equilibrium is cardinal.
Proof: Let eij 2 ­i be the signal for player i that assigns probability one to the jth action of
player i being part of a success pro¯le, and let zi 2 ­ be the signal that assigns probability one
to the signal that all of player i's actions are equally likely to be part of a success pro¯le. De¯ne
Ei to be the distribution of player i's signals that assigns probability one to the set of signals
fei1;:::;eiJ(i);zig and equal probability to all signals in that set.




n=1 is a sequence of distributions converging weakly to F; denoted Gn
w ¡ ! F; where each
Gn has mass points at indi®erence and at certainty. Let Ei;k be the distribution of player i's
signals that assigns probability one to the set of signals ~ ­i ½ ­i that are within distance 1
k from
the set fei1;:::;eiJ(i);zig and that is uniform on ~ ­i: De¯ne Hn;i;k = ¸nEi;k + (1 ¡ ¸n)Fi, and
let Hn;k =
QI
i=1 Hn;i;k: Then fHn;kg1
k=1 is a sequence of distribution functions with Hn;k
w ¡ ! Gn;
where each Hn;k has an everywhere positive density.
Clearly, candidates for an optimal ordinal strategy for Hn;k have to be exhaustive. Since
there are only ¯nitely many paths of play for exhaustive strategies, an optimal ordinal strategy
¾k
n for Hn;k exists. Finiteness of the set of play paths of exhaustive strategies also implies that
there is a subsequence of fHn;kg1
k=1 for which (after reindexing) the path of play induced by
f¾k
ng1
k=1 is constant. From now on consider this subsequence, and pick a strategy ¾n that induces
this path of play.
Given a signal realization !; denote player i's expected payo® from the strategy pro¯le ¾ by





Let 1f¾;a;tg be the indicator of the event that pro¯le a is visited for the ¯rst time in period t
under strategy ¾ and P(aj!) the probability that the pro¯le a is a success given the signal vector





Here P(aj!) is a polynomial in ! and therefore varies continuously with !: Since ~ ¾ is ordinal, the
indicator function does not vary with ! (recall that is !i passes through a point of indi®erence
18between two action, they simply become relabeled). Taken together, these observations imply
that vi(~ ¾;!) is continuous in !: Hence, by weak convergence of Hn;k to Gn; we have
Ui(~ ¾;Hn;k) ! Ui(~ ¾;Gn);
for any ordinal strategy ~ ¾: Therefore, ¾n must be an optimal ordinal strategy for Gn:
Denote by ¾0
n the improvement strategy for ¾n; given Gn as constructed in the proof of
Lemma (1). For any given ¾0















²¾i;n(!i) if j!i ¡ eijj = x · ²
Note that the payo® vi(¾²




n;Gn) as k ! 1:






n;Gn) as ² ! 0:
Note that the payo® vi(¾n;!) is a continuous function of the signal vector !: Hence, weak
convergence implies that
Ui(¾n;Hn;k) ! Ui(¾n;Gn) as k ! 1:
Combining these observations, we conclude that for any n; we can ¯nd k(n) and ~ ² such that
Ui(¾~ ²
n;Hn;k(n)) > Ui(¾n;Hn;k(n)):
To conclude, simply let Fn = Hn;k(n): ¤
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